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Abstract 
Yu et al. and Li et al. have proposed the measure-resend protocols of authenticated 
semi-quantum key distribution (ASQKD). A new measure-resend ASQKD protocol is 
proposed in this paper, which requires a lower burden of quantum resource, needs fewer 
bits of the pre-shared key, and even provides better qubit efficiency than their protocols. 
The security proof shows the robustness of the proposed protocol under the collective 
attack. 
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1 Introduction 
The quantum key distribution (QKD) is one important research topic of quantum 
cryptography, enabling a secret key to be distributed on the quantum channel among 
participants. In 2007, Boyer et al. [1] first proposed the protocol of semi-quantum key 
distribution (SQKD), in which Bob is a classical participant who can only perform three 
out of the following four operations: (1) measure qubits in The z-basis, (2) generate 
qubits in The z-basis and send, (3) reorder qubits, and (4) reflect qubits. In particular, 
the measure-resend SQKD in [2] allows the classical user to perform (1), (2), and (4) 
operations, together with the use of a classical authentication channel. In 2014, Yu et al. 
[3] proposed two authenticated semi-quantum key distribution (ASQKD) protocols, in 
which maximally entangled Bell states and pre-shared keys are used. They do not need 
the classical authentication channels, but a public classical channel to announce 
information during key distribution is still required. In 2016, Li et al. [4] proposed two 
ASQKD protocols, in which though Bell states are still used, the classical channel is 
removed1.  
The proposed protocol has the following features: First, low burden of the quantum 
resource, i.e., only single photons are used instead of maximally entangled Bell states. 
Second, the required pre-shared keys are reduced: two pre-shared keys are used. One is 
for the position of decoy photons, and the other is for choosing a hash function from 
the universal hash functions [5]. The total number of pre-shared keys are 𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑚𝑚 bits. 
Third, the security proof is given, which shows the proposed protocol has robustness 
under the collective attack. Finally, when there is no eavesdropping being detected, all 
the pre-shared keys can be recycled securely. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the proposed 
ASQKD protocol. Section 3 presents the security analyses. Section 4 shows the 
comparison with Yu et al.’s and Li et al.’s measure-resend protocols. Section 5 
concludes this paper. 
2 Proposed measure-resend ASQKD protocol 
The proposed protocol (shown in Fig. 1) uses two-step quantum communication. The 
quantum channel is assumed to be free from error and noise. Alice has full quantum 
capabilities while Bob has only limited quantum capabilities. Assume Alice would like  
                                                        
1 A 1-bit authentication message Alice used to inform Bob is still needed. 
to distribute a key to Bob. In the beginning, Alice and Bob both have pre-shared secret 
keys 𝐾𝐾1, 𝐾𝐾2 and a pool of universal hash functions. The length of 𝐾𝐾1 is 𝑛𝑛 + 𝑚𝑚 bits 
while the length of 𝐾𝐾2 is 𝑚𝑚 bits.  
Fig. 1. The proposed ASQKD protocol 
Step 1. Alice determines a key, 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 , which is a binary string of length 𝑛𝑛 , to be 
distributed to Bob. She chooses a hash function from the pool of universal hash 
functions based on the pre-shared key 𝐾𝐾2. Then, 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 is hashed by the selected hash 
function to get an 𝑚𝑚-bit hash value. The binary string, 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾, and the corresponding hash 
value are concatenated to become 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴, whose length is 𝑛𝑛 + 𝑚𝑚 bits. 
Step 2. Alice generates a string 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 ∈ {0}𝑛𝑛+𝑚𝑚. 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷  is inserted into 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 based on the 
pre-shared key 𝐾𝐾1 (If the 𝑖𝑖-th bit of 𝐾𝐾1 = 0, the 𝑖𝑖-th bit of 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷  is inserted in front of 
the 𝑖𝑖-th bit of 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴. Otherwise, it is inserted behind). Thus a binary string of length 2𝑛𝑛 +2𝑚𝑚 bits is produced. Then, according to this binary string, Alice generates a sequence 
of single photons named 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 with the following rules: For 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴, 0 is encoded to |0⟩, and 
1 is encoded to |1⟩. For 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 , all bits of 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷  are encoded to |+⟩ = 1√2 (|0⟩+ |1⟩). 
Finally, she sends 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴, one bit at a time, to Bob via a public quantum channel. 
Step 3. According to the pre-shared key 𝐾𝐾1, Bob can distinguish bits in 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 from bits 
in 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 . For each received photon belonging to 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴, Bob measures it in The z-basis and 
resends the single photon in The z-basis based on the result of measurement (If the 
result of the measurement is 0 then resend |0⟩, else resend |1⟩). If the received photon 
belongs to 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 , and Bob reflects it without any disturbance. Since Bob has no delay line 
to store photons, each time he has to process one photon and send it back to Alice. 
Step 4.  
Alice: Upon receiving photons from Bob, Alice measures these photons. For those 
photons belonging to 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴′ , Alice measures them in The z-basis. For photons belonging 
to 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷′ , Alice measures them in The x-basis. If the binary strings of 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴′  and 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷′  from 
the measurement result are not the same as the original 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 and 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 , there must be an 
eavesdropper’s attack during the process.  
Bob: In the meantime, while Bob gets 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾′  and its corresponding hash value 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐾𝐾2(𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾)′  from the measurement result in Step 3, he puts 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾′  into the hash 
function and compares 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐾𝐾2(𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾′) with 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐾𝐾2(𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾)′. If 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐾𝐾2(𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾′) is equal 
to 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐾𝐾2(𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾)′ , Bob can assure that he gets the distributed key sent by Alice. 
Otherwise, there must be an eavesdropper’s attack. 
Step 5. After the checks in Step 4, Alice and Bob will both send a 1-bit authenticated 
message to inform the other. If all checks are passed, the used pre-shared keys will be 
recycled. Otherwise, the result will be abandoned, and the used pre-shared keys are 
discarded. 
3 Security analyses 
In this section, we will analyze the security of the proposed protocol and prove that the 
proposed protocol is robust [1], which means when Eve attacks the protocol and gets 
some useful information, she will be detected with a non-zero probability. In this 
analysis, we assume Eve can fully control the quantum channel and has unlimited 
computational power, and she can perform the collective attack [6]. To perform the 
collective attack, Eve first prepares a quantum state |𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⟩ , and performs a unitary 
operator 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 on the joint state |𝑞𝑞⟩⨂|𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⟩, where |𝑞𝑞⟩ is the qubit transmitted between 
participants, and |𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⟩ is Eve’s prepared quantum state. Eve can use different quantum 
state |𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⟩ and unitary operators 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 on the qubits which are sent from Alice or sent 
from Bob. But she needs to use same |𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⟩ and 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 in every round of attack. 
Theorem 1. The proposed protocol is robust under the collective attack, i.e., if there is 
no error, the protocol does not leak any information about the pre-shared key and the 
newly shared key. 
Proof. We denote the unitary operator 𝑈𝑈1 which Eve used to attack the qubits sent 
from Alice to Bob by: 
𝑈𝑈1|00⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴4⟩ 
𝑈𝑈1|01⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴4⟩ 
𝑈𝑈1|10⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴4⟩ 
𝑈𝑈1|11⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩ , 
where |𝐸𝐸1⟩  is Eve’s prepared quantum state and |𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩, |𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩, |ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩, |𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩  are Eve’s 
quantum states after the attack. 
Because Alice will only send four different qubit pairs: |0 +⟩, |+ 0⟩, |1 +⟩, or |+ 1⟩ in 
the protocol, we can denote these situations by: 
𝑈𝑈1|0 +⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴4⟩)+ 1
√2 (𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴4⟩) 
𝑈𝑈1|+ 0⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴4⟩)+ 1
√2 (𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴4⟩) 
𝑈𝑈1|1 +⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴4⟩)+ 1
√2 (𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩) 
𝑈𝑈1|+ 1⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴4⟩)+ 1
√2 (𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴1|00⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴1⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴2|01⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴2⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴3|10⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴3⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴4|11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩) , 
Upon receiving the attacked qubits, Bob will measure the qubits in 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 in The z-basis. 
And after he receives all qubits from Alice, he will check the hash value. If the attacker 
changes the qubits in The z-basis, the hash value check will fail, and then the attack 
will be detected. By the definition of robustness, we can assume the attacker will not 
change the value of the qubits in The z-basis. This gives a limit to the possible 𝑈𝑈1, and 
we can denote the limited 𝑈𝑈1 by: 
𝑈𝑈1|0 +⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩ + |01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩) 
𝑈𝑈1|+ 0⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩ + |10⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩) 
𝑈𝑈1|1 +⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (|10⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩ + |11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩) 
𝑈𝑈1|+ 1⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = 1
√2 (|01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩ + |11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩) . 
When Bob sends the qubits back to Alice, Eve can use a different unitary operator 𝑈𝑈2 
to attack again. We denote the unitary operator 𝑈𝑈2 by:  
𝑈𝑈2|00⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵4⟩ 
𝑈𝑈2|01⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵4⟩ 
𝑈𝑈2|10⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵3⟩+ 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵4⟩ 
𝑈𝑈2|11⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵2⟩+ 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵3⟩+ 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵4⟩ , 
where |𝐸𝐸2⟩ is Eve’s newly prepared quantum state and |𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖⟩, |𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖⟩, |ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖⟩, |𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖⟩ are 
Eve’s quantum states after the attack. 
The situations in the protocol are denoted by: 
𝑈𝑈2
1
√2 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴1|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩|00⟩+ 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴2|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩|01⟩)|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 1
√2 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴1|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩)(𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵4⟩) + 1
√2 (𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴2|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩)(𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵4⟩) 
𝑈𝑈2
1
√2 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴1|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩|00⟩+ 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩|10⟩)|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 1
√2 (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴1|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩)(𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵4⟩) + 1
√2 (𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩)(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵2⟩+ 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵3⟩+ 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵4⟩) 
𝑈𝑈2
1
√2 (𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩|10⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴4|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩|11⟩)|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 1
√2 (𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴3|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩)(𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵4⟩) + 1
√2 (𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴4|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩)(𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵2⟩+ 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵4⟩) 
𝑈𝑈2
1
√2 (𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴2|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩|01⟩+ 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴4|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩|11⟩)|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = 1
√2 (𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴2|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩)(𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵1⟩+ 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵2⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵4⟩) + 1
√2 (𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴4|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩)(𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵1|00⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵1⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵2|01⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵2⟩+ 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵3|10⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵3⟩ + 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵4|11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵4⟩) . 
Alice will check all the received qubits. This check gives some limits of the possible of 
𝑈𝑈1 and 𝑈𝑈2. Combine all limits above. We can get  
𝑈𝑈1|00⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = |00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩ 
𝑈𝑈1|01⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = |01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩ 
𝑈𝑈1|10⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = |10⟩|ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩ 
𝑈𝑈1|11⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩ = |11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩ , 
𝑈𝑈2|00⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = |00⟩|𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵1⟩ 
𝑈𝑈2|01⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = |01⟩|𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵2⟩ 
𝑈𝑈2|10⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = |10⟩|ℎ𝐵𝐵3⟩ 
𝑈𝑈2|11⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩ = |11⟩|𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵4⟩ , 
And |𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴1⟩ = |𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴2⟩ = |ℎ𝐴𝐴3⟩ = |𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴4⟩, |𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵1⟩ = |𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵2⟩ = |ℎ𝐵𝐵3⟩ = |𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵4⟩ . 
We hence prove that there is no unitary operator to be used to get useful information 
about the pre-shared key and the newly shared key without being detected. 
4 Comparison 
Table 1. Comparison among measure-resend ASQKD protocols 
 Yu et al.’s  
measure-resend 
ASQKD 
Li et al.’s  
measure-resend 
ASQKD 
The proposed  
measure-resend 
ASQKD 
Classical 
participants’ 
quantum capabilities 
Measure 
Generate 
Reflect 
Measure 
Generate 
Reflect 
Measure 
Generate 
Reflect 
Quantum resource Bell state 
Bell state, 
single photons 
Single photons 
Qubit efficiency 1/10 1/9 1/6 
Required pre-shared 
keys (in bits) 
𝟑𝟑𝒏𝒏 + 𝟑𝟑𝒎𝒎 𝟐𝟐𝒏𝒏 + 𝟐𝟐𝒎𝒎 𝒏𝒏 + 𝟐𝟐𝒎𝒎 
Required classical 
channel 
Public discussion 
1-bit authenticated 
message 
1-bit authenticated 
message (2 times) 
Hash function No Public hash Secret hash 
To compare the proposed protocol with Yu et al.’s and Li et al.’s measure-resend 
protocols, (1) classical participants’ quantum capabilities, (2) quantum resource, (3) 
qubit efficiency, (4) bit number of pre-shared keys, (5) classical channels required 
during key distribution, and (6) hash function are given in Table 1 above. 
The qubit efficiency is defined as the number of distributed key bits divided by the total 
number of generated qubits [4]. It is assumed that 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑚𝑚, then the qubit efficiency of 
the proposed protocol is 𝑛𝑛(2n+2m) + (n+m), which is equal to 1/6 and is higher than Yu et 
al.’s and Li et al.’s. 2𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑚𝑚 is for 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 sent from Alice, and 𝑛𝑛 + 𝑚𝑚 is for photons 
belonging to 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 resent from Bob. 
5 Conclusions 
Two-step quantum transmission is used in the proposed measure-resend ASQKD 
protocol to perform the key distributed from Alice to Bob. The process of the proposed 
protocol only needs two 1-bit authenticated classical messages. It is robust under the 
collective attack. The contributions of the proposed protocol are the following: (1) 
lowering down the burden of the quantum resource using single photons, (2) reducing 
the number of pre-shared keys, (3) providing a formal proof of security, and (4) 
achieving better qubit efficiency than the state-of-the-art measure-resend protocols.  
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